@ Ahram Online
Despite decades of
planning for Egypt 's eventual transition into an Islamic state, only two years
of post-revolution politics appear to have put paid to the Muslim Brotherhood's
longed-for Islamist renaissance
As Egypt 's first freely
chosen president took the stage last summer, the thousands arrayed in Cairo 's
Tahrir Square roared their approval. After a knife's-edge vote, the Muslim
Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi had clinched the country's most powerful civilian
position – the secretive Islamist organization's goal for over eight decades.
Now, surely, an Islamic state was within its grasp.
But one year on, Morsi's
unofficial inauguration in downtown Cairo seems more like the pinnacle of the
Islamists' power then the emergence of a Sharia-compliant Egypt .
In fact, the Muslim
Brotherhood's dream of establishing an Islamic state in Egypt is nowhere close
to becoming a reality. Some experts believe that, not only has Morsi's first
year in power tarnished the image of the 85-year-old group, but that of all
Islamists.
Following Mubarak's
downfall in February 2011, the Islamists – and specifically the Brotherhood –
were expected to effortlessly climb to power. They were the largest opposition
present at the time and had the sympathy of many average Egyptians. Their
selling point was Islamic Law and the establishment of an Islamic state that
would take Egypt back to the glory days of Islam.
The Brotherhood quickly
established its political leg, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).
Meanwhile, members of
Egypt 's Salafist Call – the country's largest Salafist movement – established
the Nour Party. During the Mubarak era, Salafists had refused to participate in
opposition politics on grounds that it was sinful to oppose a Muslim ruler.
Parliamentary,
constitutional travails
The two competed in the
first post-Mubarak parliamentary and Shura Council elections, winning
majorities in both. Despite their lackluster performance in parliament – in
which they were accused of ignoring pressing matters, such as Egypt's failing
economy, while focusing on trivial issues – they remained popular with many
Egyptians.
"Their performance
in parliament had a negative impact," explained political analyst and
former MP Emad Gad. "But when Morsi came to power, most people still had a
positive view of the Islamic project. But during his first year in office he
managed to destroy this image in the eyes of most Egyptians."
He points out that Morsi
has made many promises that he never kept and that his regime has tried to
'Brotherhoodise' the nation by taking over many of the country's top
institutions, including the Ministry of Interior and the judiciary.
However, Gad adds that
the turning point came when he passed a constitution that was rejected by most
political forces in Egypt .
The constituent assembly
tasked with drafting Egypt 's new constitution saw numerous squabbles, along
with accusations that Islamist assembly members were forcing their opinions on
the non-Islamist minority. This led most non-Islamist members to withdraw from
the constitution-drafting body, leaving only the Islamists to conduct a final
vote in a 14-hour marathon session.
"After this, he
confirmed to the public that the Islamic current is undemocratic and does not
like dialogue," said Gad.
Morsi's refusal to
fulfill his promises, including the creation of a coalition government that
would include Egypt 's diverse political forces, also hurt his popularity, say
critics.
"His lack of
commitment to democracy made people not trust him," explained Khalil
El-Anani, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington .
"Secondly, it showed that the Islamists are fascists, and don't have a
democratic ideology."
Additionally, many
Egyptians began to realize that what is said and what is done are two different
things.
"He talked about the
Islamic project, but did not apply Islamic Law, which is one of the main
sellers of the Islamic project," said El-Anani.
El-Anani pointed out that
Morsi agreed to take a loan from the IMF at interest, which is forbidden by
Islamic Law.
However, Ahmed Sobie, a
leading member of the FJP shoots down these accusations.
“The Islamic current has
actually proven to be much more democratic and more serious about pushing Egypt
into a democratic path then the other currents,” he said.
He pointed out that it is
the Islamist current that has fought to keep the parliament and Shura Council
in place. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) that was ruling Egypt
after the ousting of Mubarak had dissolved the parliament in June after a
ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) found fault with laws
governing the assembly's elections.
One of Morsi's first
actions after becoming president is to reinstate the parliament. When the SCC
suspended his decision a few days later, the Islamists began a yearlong fight
to keep the Shura Council, which was threatened with a similar fate.
“We did this to protect
Egypt . We had to make sure that all its important institutions were working,”
Sobie added.
He also said that it was
the Islamists who fought to draft a new constitution for Egypt . He also denied
that the Islamists controlled the constituent assembly.
“Let's not forget that it
was the Islamist ultra conservative Building and Development Party that decided
to give up their seats in the constituent assembly for the liberals and
leftists,” Sobie said. “They did this in order to give them a voice,” stressed
Sobie.
He also pointed out that
it was Morsi who turned Egypt from a military state to a civil state.
“I doubt either the liberal
or Nasserists would have been able to do this amidst all the criticism we
received,” explained Sobie.
Alienating the Islamists
However, it is not just
the liberal and leftists forces that are at loggerheads with Morsi. The
Islamists themselves have also felt let down by him.
“I believe that Morsi's
first year in power, had a negative impact on the Islamic project,” said Nader
Bakar, spokesperson of the Salafist Nour Party.
He accused Morsi and the
Brotherhood of marginalizing and alienating anyone who is not a member of the
group. Then he points out that shed a bad light on the Islamic project.
“The Islamic project does
not say that you discriminate between the citizens of one country; it does not
say promote authoritarian rule, it does not tell us to ignore those who have
opposing views,” explained Bakar. “The stubbornness of the Brotherhood and the
unprofessional manner in which they dealt with all the problems of the country
has had a negative impact on the way average Egyptians view the Islamists.”
The Islamists also had
other gripes with Morsi including his decision to license liquor stores and his
lack of support to officers wanting to sport Islamist-style beards. He also
opted to smooth relations with Iran thus paving the way for Shia tourists – often
seen as a threat by Sunni Muslims – to enter Egypt .
"He also allowed
security forces to pursue jihadists, which turned even more Islamists against
him," said El-Anani.
He adds that several
other factors have led to the Brotherhood's failure to lead the country, one of
which is the lack of experience in running a populous, diverse and complex
state like Egypt .
Mubarak's iron-fisted
rule and repression of the Islamists also resulted in their being excluded from
working in government bodies and gaining needed experience.
"Another is the
secretive character of the Brotherhood," said El-Anani. "They know
how to work under pressure, but not openly."
Nor did Egypt 's January
25 Revolution provide the group sufficient time to go from repressed opposition
to ruling power.
El-Anani cited the
example of Turkey , where the Islamists were gradually drawn into politics
allowing them to develop their ideas and moderate their political discourse and
approach.
In Egypt , by contrast,
the Brotherhood was faced with what El-Anani calls "sudden
inclusion."
"They couldn't
strike the balance between being an opposition movement and a responsible
political force or ruling party. So they now hover between both," he
explained. "They still think of themselves as an opposition movement,
staging protests, strikes and sit-ins; the mindset has not changed."
On a more practical
level, Morsi's government has failed to provide Egyptians with much needed
services. During the past year, there have been frequent power cuts, along with
shortages of diesel fuel, gasoline and bread, among other vital commodities.
"These shortfalls
are what bother people the most," says political analyst Amr Hashem Rabie.
"In terms of other issues – concerning politics, judicial independence,
human rights and civil rights – Mubarak repressed the Egyptians in all this,
too. But he, at least, offered these services to the people, so they were
patient with his rule to a certain extent."
Islamist disunity
What's more, the
Islamists' united front after Mubarak's downfall did not last long. Within
months, cracks appeared, as electoral rivalries heated up.
Hostilities climaxed when
the Salafist Nour Party split in early 2013, after party president Emad
Abdel-Ghafour defected and announced the formation of a new party, the Watan
Party. There were reports that the Brotherhood had played a role in the falling
out.
"The Brotherhood
encouraged the differences between the Salafists to split and weaken
them," explained El-Anani. "This is what used to happen under
Mubarak; it's the same old game played by Mubarak-era leaders to divide the
opposition in order to manipulate them."
Another issue is that
inter-Islamist divisions have always been present. Their unity in the days
following the revolution, says El-Anani, was only temporary.
"There has always
been historical tension between them," he explained. "They never
trusted each other. This dates back to the end of the 1970s and early 1980s,
when they clashed in Alexandria University ."
Tarek Osman, author of '
Egypt on the Brink,' added that the revolution had brought together different
Islamic forces to fight a common enemy.
"The revolution
brought together these forces behind a very clear objective: defining
themselves as 'Islamists' against the old regime and against the liberal
current in Egypt ," he said. "The more they delve into the details of
the country's legislative, political and economic transition, the more the
fractures appear."
Many Egyptians are now
discontented with the Brotherhood's performance. The group's seeming confusion
has prompted a popular joke: "The Brotherhood fought to control Egypt for
80 years but had no plan what to do when it actually achieved it."
It remains unclear how
much damage this last year has done to the Islamists' popularity.
"In this struggle
about the country's social identity, the shape of the future, the loudest voice
– the key determinant – will be the 45-million Egyptians under 35 years
old," said Osman. "Their preferences, ideas and views will be the
deciding factor," he asserted. "At the end of the day, it is a fight
over the hearts and minds of this generation."
© 2010 Ahram Online
" On a more practical level, Morsi's government has failed to provide Egyptians with much needed services. During the past year, there have been frequent power cuts, along with shortages of diesel fuel, gasoline and bread, among other vital commodities.
ReplyDelete"These shortfalls are what bother people the most," says political analyst Amr Hashem Rabie. "In terms of other issues – concerning politics, judicial independence, human rights and civil rights – Mubarak repressed the Egyptians in all this, too. But he, at least, offered these services to the people, so they were patient with his rule to a certain extent."
These two sentences confirm what I have argued many times - History has shown that lack of economic wellbeing has played the major role in the French and Russian revolutions, the American War of Independence, the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, of Napoleon Bonaparte, the fall of Marcos and Soeharto, the Arab "Spring" in Tunisia & Egypt and now the ouster of Morsi.
When economic times are dire for the majority of people, they will turn to whatever force which they believe will relieve them of their plight, irrespective of whether its rume will be democratic or authoritarian.
Most people can live with a benevolent dictatorship which provides for their wellbeing, and does not persecute them on account of their race or religion, rather than a dysfunctional democracy which doesn't provide for their economic welfare but gives them all sorts of freedoms, which are meaningless when one is hungry, is economically insecure and has no roof over their heads.
That is why people in a liberal democratic Weimar Republic with an economy in a shambles can accept the dictatorial rule of Hitler and the Nazis in the hope that it would provide them with a solution out of their economic woes, and to an extent, it did.
On another note, it pains me to see the extent of ethnic division which has and is occurring in Malaysia, post GE13, and how it will play out till GE14 is left to be seen.
There does not seem to be any attempts at reconciliation on either side of the ethnic divide, especially not between most Malays and Chinese, save a minority.
Looking through the various blogs and comments on them, I see much chauvanism and hatred on both sides.
During Mahathir's time, especially before the Asian financial crisis, I never felt such sense of togetherness between Malaysians than before.
Then again, the economy was booming, jobs were aplenty and with bellies full, issues such as press freedom, freedom of speech, the position of the Malays, etc. kind of took a back seat.
su