Muslims and Muslim
governments are angry with Bashar al-Assad. They hold him responsible for the
massacre of thousands of people, many of them innocent civilians, in Syria.
They want him to go.
It is true that Bashar’s
army has killed a lot of people. It has used excessive force --- as I have
pointed out in a number of articles before this. Anyone with a conscience would
condemn the mindless violence that has bloodied Syria in the last 17 months.
But Bashar’s violence is
only one side of the story. The armed
rebels opposed to him have also massacred thousands. How else can one explain
the fact that almost one-third of the 17,000 people killed so far in the
conflict are from the army and related security agencies?
The rebels are not only
well equipped with a range of weapons and communication apparatus but are also
supported by logistical routes developed by the CIA and intelligence provided
by Mossad. Their weapons are delivered through “a shadowy network of
intermediaries, including the Muslim Brotherhood,” and “are paid for by Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey.” Since April
2012, hundreds, perhaps even a few thousand, militants, some linked to Al-Qaeda
and its affiliates, from Iraq, Libya, Tunisia and Jordan have crossed over into
Syria to fight the Bashar government in what they perceive as a “jihad.” It is
reported that out of 200 rebels captured in Aleppo recently, 70 were foreign
fighters.
The mainstream media in
most Muslim majority states have not highlighted these aspects of the Syrian
conflict. Neither have they subjected to scrutiny the authenticity of the news
they carry on the conflict and the sources of the news items. As a case in
point, the Houla massacre of 25 May 2012 was widely publicised all over the
world as an example of the brutal, barbaric character of the Bashar government.
Scores of children were allegedly butchered by his militia. A picture of a
large number of dead children “wrapped in white shrouds with a child jumping
over one of them” was offered as proof of the heinous crime. The picture was
actually from the war in Iraq in 2003. The photographer himself, Marco Di Lauro
of Getty Images, came out in the open to expose the fabrication. In fact, the Houla massacre itself was
“committed by anti-Assad Sunni militants, and the bulk of the victims were
members of the Alawi and Shia minorities, which have been largely supportive of
the Assad”, according to the leading German daily, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).
Houla is not the only
case. A Christian nun, Mother Agnes-Mariam de la Croix of the St. James
Monastery has published on the monastery’s website, an account of armed rebels
gathering Christian and Alawi hostages in a building in the Khalidiya
neighbourhood in Homs, and blowing it up with dynamite. The rebels then put the
blame for the crime upon the Syrian army.
There is also the story of Zainab al-Hosni, allegedly abducted by
government forces and burnt to death. A few weeks later, Zainab appeared on
Syrian television to nail the lie about her. The most widely quoted source for
the alleged atrocities committed by the Syrian government is of course the
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) which is a one man operation run by
a Rami Abdul Rahman from Coventry, England. His statistics have been challenged
on a number of occasions by Syrian analysts who have shown why his reporting is
unreliable.
It is disappointing that
most Muslim governments and NGOs are oblivious to all this and focus only upon
Bashar’s wrongdoings. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its
emergency summit held in Mecca on 14 August 2012 reflected this biased approach
to the Syrian conflict by condemning only the government while exonerating the
armed rebels. A few states such as Algeria, Kazakhstan and Pakistan called for
a balanced statement from the summit that would also apportion blame upon the
armed opposition but their plea was ignored. Worse, Syria which was suspended
from the OIC at the summit was not even invited to the meeting and given a
chance to defend itself. It was denied the most elementary principle of natural
justice. It is a right that is fundamental to Islamic jurisprudence.
Why has the Muslim world
as a whole, especially its elites and its intelligentsia, adopted such a
blatantly biased and starkly unjust position on Syria? Is it because many are
ignorant of what is really happening in that country, given the orientation of
the mainstream media? Or is it because Muslims revere the Saudi monarch so much
--- he is after all the custodian of the two holy mosques--- that they are
convinced that in seeking the elimination of Bashar al-Assad he is doing what
is morally right? Or is it because many
Muslim elites are beholden to Saudi wealth --- and Qatari largesse ---- that
they are prepared to acquiesce in their wishes?
Or is it also because of certain sectarian sentiments that Muslims
appear to be incensed with the Bashar government?
It is these sentiments
that I shall now explore. For many months now a segment of Sunni ulama
(religious elites) in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and certain other states have been
attacking Bashar as an Alawite leader who is oppressing the Sunni majority. Since
Alawites are a branch of Shia Islam, the target has been Shia teachings and the
Shia sect. Given the standing of these ulama, their vitriolic utterances have
succeeded in inflaming the passions of some Sunni youth who view Bashar and his
circle as infidels who should be fought and defeated at all costs. Even the spiritual
guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, has now joined the
bandwagon and accuses Shias of theological deviance and malpractices.
It is important to observe
in this regard that in the context of Syria there is no rigid Shia-Sunni
dichotomy. The Sunnis given their numerical strength dominate the army, the
public services and the private sector. Some of the most critical positions in
Syrian society are held by Sunnis. The Grand Mufti of Syria for instance is a
Sunni of the Shafie doctrinal school. Indeed,
sectarian, or for that matter, religious affiliation has very little weight in
society. In many ways, Syria is a society that has sought to de-emphasise
religious and sectarian loyalties and nurture a notion of common
citizenship. Since the beginning of the
conflict, it is the Western media that have been preoccupied with the so-called
Sunni-Shia divide and appear to be deliberately stoking sectarian sentiments.
The Arab media has followed suit.
The way in which
Sunni-Shia sentiments are now being manipulated convinces me that geopolitics
rather than sectarian loyalties is the motivating force. If sectarian loyalties
are really that important, how does one explain the close ties that the Sunni
Saudi elite enjoyed with the Shia Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, in the sixties
and much of the seventies? Was it
because the Shah was the gendarme of the US and the West in the Persian Gulf
and an ally of Israel? Was this the reason why the Saudis could get along so
well with the Iranian elite? Isn’t it
revealing that it was only when the Shah was ousted in a popular revolution in
1979 and the new Islamic leaders of Iran rejected American hegemony over the
region and challenged the legitimacy of the Israeli entity, that Saudi
relations with Iran took a turn for the worse?
Saudi animosity towards
the new independent minded Iran was so great that it bankrolled the Iraqi instigated
war against Iran from 1980 to 1988. The primary goal of that war was to
strangulate Iran’s Islamic Revolution at its birth. The war brought together a
number of pro-US Arab states with the notable exception of Syria. Needless to
say the US and other Western powers aided and abetted this anti-Iran coalition.
It was during this time that anti-Shia propaganda was exported from Saudi
Arabia to Pakistan and other parts of South and Southeast Asia. Groups within
the Shia community also began to respond to these attacks by churning out their
own anti-Sunni literature.
In spite of the relentless
opposition to it, Iran, much to the chagrin of its adversaries in the region
and in the West, has continued to grow from strength to strength, especially in
the diplomatic and military spheres. One of its major achievements is the solid
link it has forged with Syria, on the one hand, and the Hezbollah in Lebanon,
on the other. It is the most significant resistance link that has emerged ---
resistance to Israel and US hegemony--- in West Asia and North Africa (WANA) in
recent decades.
Israel, the US and other
Western powers such as Britain and France, and actors in WANA like Saudi
Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, are worried. The Iran helmed resistance has increased
their apprehension in light of five other related developments.
One, Iran’s nuclear capability. Though Iranian leaders have
declared on a number of occasions that they regard the manufacture and use of a
nuclear bomb as haram (prohibited), there is no doubt that the
country’s nuclear capability has been enhanced considerably in recent years.
Two, the inability of Israel to defeat Hezbollah and gain
control over Lebanon which it regards as its frontline defence. This was proven
again in 2006 and today Hezbollah is in a more decisive position in Lebanese
politics than it was six years ago.
Three, the Anglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003
and the introduction of electoral democracy which has led to the rise of Shia
political power. Shia political elites in Iraq are by and large inclined
towards Iran, which the US sees as a huge setback for its hegemonic ambitions
in the region.
Four, the Arab uprisings, especially those that are mass based,
like in Tunisia and Egypt, have raised questions about the shape of democratic
politics in the region in the coming years. Will it give rise to the emergence
of Islamic movements that challenge the legitimacy of Israel, US hegemony and
the role of feudal monarchies in WANA?
Or, would it be possible to co-opt the new Islamic actors into the
status quo?
Five, how will all these changes unfold in a situation where US
hegemony is declining? How will Israel and the other states in WANA that are
dependent upon US power for the perpetuation of their interests fare when the
US is no longer able to protect them as it did in the past?
For Israel in particular
all these developments in WANA portend a less secure neighbourhood. Total
control and predictability are crucial elements in Israel’s notion of security.
It is because of its obsession with security that guarantees control over its
neighbourhood that it is determined to break the link between Iran, Syria and
the Hezbollah. It reckons that if Bashar is ousted that link would be broken.
This was obvious in the
conversation between Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Russian
President, Vladimir Putin, as reported by the respected Jewish journalist,
Israel Shamir. Netanyahu made it clear that Israel preferred “the Somalisation
of Syria, its break-up and the elimination of its army.” Bashar’s successor
---- after his ouster--- he stressed “must break with Iran.” Netanyahu gave the impression that Israel was
in a position to “influence the rebels.”
Since this is Israel’s
agenda for Syria, all the moves and manoeuvres of states like Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Turkey to eliminate Bashar would be very much in line with what
Israel wants. Any wonder then that both Israeli leaders and its media welcomed
the suspension of Syria from the OIC. In this regard, Israel would have been
thrilled to read a pronouncement by Al-Qaradawi in May 2012, widely reported in
the WANA media that “If the Prophet Muhammad was alive today, he would lend his
support to NATO.”
More than endorsement from
within the region, what Israel has always been confident about is the patronage
and protection of the US and most of Europe. On Syria, and in the ultimate
analysis, on Iran, the Israeli political and military elites know that the centres
of power in the West share its diabolical agenda. Indeed, it is Israel that
determines the US’s position on critical issues pertaining to WANA. It is the
tail that wags the dog.
Israel’s relationship with
a major Arab state like Saudi Arabia, (with whom it has no formal diplomatic
ties) on the one hand, and the US, on the other, tells us a great deal about
who is in charge of who. The Kenyan- American scholar, Professor Ali Mazrui,
once described the Saudi-US nexus this way: the problem with the custodian of
the Holy Mosques is that there is a custodian of the custodian.
If I may add, since it is
Israel that decides US foreign policy in WANA, it may not be inaccurate to say
that there is a custodian of the custodian of the custodian.
Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is
President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST).
Malaysia.
21 August 2012.
No comments:
Post a Comment